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GADAMER, RORTY 
AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
AS HERMENEUTICS 
Tom ROCKMORE 
RÉSUMÉ : J'entends faire valoir contre Gadamer et Rorty que l'herméneutique et l'épistémologie 
ne s'opposent pas, mais sont compatibles car, en effet, l'épistémologie est une forme d'hermé-
neutique. Je montrerai ensuite pourquoi il faut développer l'herméneutique au-delà de Gada-
mer pour enfin résoudre les difficultés épistémologiques dont il s'agit. 
SUMMARY : Against both Gadamer and Rorty, I will argue that hermeneutics and epistemology 
are not polar opposites, but compatible, since epistemology is a form of hermeneutics. I will 
further argue that hermeneutics needs to be developed beyond Gadamer as a way of resolving 
the epistemological problems. 
T he choice of this title, which is not accidental, is not intended to support, but rather contradict both Gadamer and Rorty. Gadamer maintains that phenome-
nology, in its hermeneutical form, resolves the problems of epistemology. Rorty, who 
in part relies on Gadamer, disagrees with Gadamer, since he thinks that the problems 
of epistemology have not and cannot be solved. Rorty and Gadamer agree that her-
meneutics and epistemology are mutually-exclusive, polar opposites. Against both 
Gadamer and Rorty, I will argue that hermeneutics and epistemology are not polar 
opposites, but compatible, since epistemology is a form of hermeneutics. I will fur-
ther argue that hermeneutics needs to be developed beyond Gadamer as a way of re-
solving the epistemological problems. 
In making this argument, I will be trying to rescue hermeneutics from both Gada-
mer and Rorty, from Gadamer since he thinks that he has solved the epistemological 
problem that he does not directly address, and from Rorty since he thinks that this 
problem cannot be resolved by hermeneutics or any other means. Like Rorty I will be 
appropriating Gadamer's insights for my own purposes. Yet there is nothing excep-
tional in that. For where is it written that our relation to other thinkers must be re-
stricted to faithful reproduction of their ideas within the context of the questions that 
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they themselves raise ? Gadamer, who is interested in the problem of textual inter-
pretation, borrows insights from the entire hermeneutical tradition, including, say, 
Heidegger, who is concerned with so-called authentic metaphysics, in elaborating his 
own theory. Like Gadamer, then, I will be using his insights for a project somewhat 
different than his own. 
I. RORTY'S ATTACK ON EPISTEMOLOGY 
Since Rorty relies on Gadamer, I turn first to Rorty and only then to Gadamer. 
Rorty, who defies easy categorization, can best be described as a leading anti-episte-
mological skeptic. He differs from someone like Donald Davidson, who also thinks 
that there is nothing interesting to say about knowledge, in that Rorty further denies 
that there is knowledge or even truth. Davidson, who is anything but a skeptic, 
merely holds that we can dispense with epistemology, since we get along fine with-
out a theory of knowledge. Rorty, who agrees with Davidson, thinks that we cannot 
have anything called knowledge, so that when someone brings up the question of 
epistemology the best thing to do is to change the topic. 
Rorty's approach can be understood within the decline of Anglo-American ana-
lytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy, which is still the main philosophical current in 
the English-speaking world, developed as a reaction against British idealism to which 
certain key analytic thinkers, notably Bertrand Russell, were earlier committed. This 
movement took the form of a theory of knowledge elaborated independently by three 
Cambridge thinkers : initially Russell, G.E. Moore and then Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Both Russell and Wittgenstein, but not Moore, were influenced by Gottlob Frege, the 
Austrian logician and philosopher of mathematics. The Vienna Circle represents an 
off-shoot of analytic philosophy that is strongly influenced by the early Wittgen-
stein.1 Those associated with the Vienna Circle and those influenced by them have 
mainly contributed to analytic philosophy of science. 
Rorty, who began as a faithful member of the analytic movement, which he 
hailed in his anthology on The Linguistic Turn as a revolution in philosophy.2 He 
later lost the faith. In an important book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he be-
came a severe critic of analytic philosophy and of philosophy in general. Here he re-
corded his disaffection with the analytic approach to epistemology and with the very 
idea of a theory of knowledge. According to Rorty, who earlier equated analytic phi-
losophy with all that is best in the contemporary discussion, since analytic philosophy 
fails, philosophy as such fails and should be abandoned. 
Rorty's argument can be quickly summarized as follows : First, he maintains that 
epistemology began in the seventeenth century with Descartes and continued with 
Locke and then Kant. He sees the problem of epistemology as centered on the view 
1. See, e.g., Victor KRAFT, Der Wiener Kreis. Der Ursprung des Neopositivismus. Ein Kapitel der jiingsten 
Philosophiegeschichte, Wien, Springer-Verlag, 1968. 
2. See Richard RORTY, The Linguistic Turn : Essays in Philosophical Method, Chicago, University of Chi-
cago Press, 1967, 1992. 
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of the mind as the mirror of nature that attributes to human beings the capacity, as he 
says, to discover essences. This presupposes that there are essences and that the hu-
man mind is able to know them. Human being is defined in terms of this epistemo-
logical capacity. 
The notion that our chief task is to mirror accurately, in our own Glassy Essence, the uni-
verse around us is the complement of the notion, common to Democritus and Descartes, 
that the universe is made up of very simple, clearly and distinctly knowable things, knowl-
edge of whose essences provides the master-vocabulary which permits commensuration of 
all discourses.3 
According to Rorty, the purpose of the invention of the modern view of the mind 
in the seventeenth century was to justify the idea of a theory of knowledge through 
privileged representations. Yet although there are representations, there are none that 
are privileged. In fact, the very idea that there might be such privileged representa-
tions is destroyed within analytic philosophy, which is committed to the same pro-
gram, as in Dummett and Putnam, in Sellars' attack on the myth of the given and in 
Quine's attack on the two fundamental dogmas of empiricism. "For these two chal-
lenges [i.e. Sellars' and Quine's] were challenges to the very idea of a 'theory of 
knowledge,' and thus to philosophy itself, conceived of as a discipline which centers 
around such a theory."4 
In Rorty's view, it is not possible to solve the epistemological problem either in 
the classical form in which it was raised in the seventeenth century or more recently 
in analytic philosophy. In that spirit, sure of the demise of any reasonable hope for a 
theory of knowledge, he turns to hermeneutics that he regards, not as the successor to 
epistemology, but rather as its antithesis. Epistemology and hermeneutics have noth-
ing in common. Where epistemology is concerned with commensurability, herme-
neutics is no more than a way of coping. Epistemology tries to get it right in order to 
close the discussion, but hermeneutics tries to keep the discussion going by changing 
the subject. Rorty follows Sellars in holding that what we call knowing is not an em-
pirical description but rather putting the description in an overall conceptual frame-
work. What we call '"objective truth' is no more nor less than the best idea we cur-
rently have about how to explain what is going on."5 
II. RORTY AND GADAMER 
Many things could be said about this controversial argument. Rorty's view of 
epistemology is obviously severely fore-shortened, with strong echoes of the views 
of certain key figures. He uncritically tends to utilize these views for rather different 
purposes than those for which they were formulated. Like Foucault, who thinks that a 
certain idea of man came into vogue in the modern period, Rorty thinks that episte-
mology is a recent invention. Yet since concern with the problem of knowledge is at 
3. Richard RORTY, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 357. 
4. Ibid., p. 169. 
5. Ibid, p. 385. 
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least as old as Parmenides, at best a new form of epistemology arises, say, with Des-
cartes. The early Wittgenstein thought that knowledge required a picture of reality. 
Like the later Wittgenstein, who abandoned that view, Rorty thinks that there cannot 
be a picture of reality, since the mind is not a mirror of the world. The result is skep-
ticism about the possibility of knowledge. 
To the best of my knowledge, the term "skepticism" does not occur in Gadamer's 
writings. Rorty enlists Gadamer in his argument against knowledge. His approach to 
Gadamer recalls Hirsch, a prominent critic. Hirsch regards Gadamer as offering a 
polemic against the nineteenth century preoccupation with objective truth and correct 
method represented, say, by Boeckh on the grounds that interpretation cannot be a 
science. According to Hirsch, truth cannot reside in recognizing the author's mean-
ing.6 
Rorty simply applauds what Hirsch rejects. He thinks that he uses "hermeneu-
tics" in a way that links up with the use of this term in writers such as Gadamer, Apel 
and Habermas. Yet this is certainly questionable. As I read Gadamer, Rorty simply 
turns Gadamer inside out in claiming that his theory is not a method for attaining 
truth,7 that Truth and Method is a tract directed against commensuration,8 that so-
called effective history (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewufitsein) is less concerned with 
what is in the world than how to use it for our own purposes,9 that Gadamer wants to 
get rid of the distinction between fact and value,10 etc. 
Gadamer is not entirely innocent in the matter. He invites this kind of misreading 
through the title of his book that clearly recalls the Cartesian impulse running through-
out the modern concern with epistemology — although as an anti-Cartesian he holds 
that there is no method that necessarily yields truth through its correct application. He 
further invites this misreading through his suggestion, which is the title of a section in 
the book, about "The overcoming of the epistemological problem through phenome-
nological research." 
III. GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS 
Gadamer regards hermeneutics as a form of phenomenology, in the sense that 
phenomenology, like Dilthey research, depends on explication rather than on expla-
nation.11 Gadamer has no discernible method, certainly none if compared, say, with 
Husserl, with whom he wishes to be compared. The suggestion that he offers a 
method leading to truth can only be intended ironically. For if taken literally or in, 
say, a Cartesian sense, it invites the kind of reading that Rorty presents but that is 
6. See E.D. HIRSCH, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, New Haven, Yale, 1967, 1979. 
7. See RORTY, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 357. 
8. See ibid., p. 358, fn. 1. 
9. See/fcid., p. 359. 
10. See ibid., p. 360. 
11. See "Kant and the Hermeneutical Turn," in Hans-Georg GADAMER, Heidegger's Ways, trans. John W. 
Stanley, Albany, SUNY Press, 1994, p. 51. 
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very far from his intention. Although he claims that hermeneutics is universal, hence 
arguably part of or even a replacement epistemology, or perhaps a type of epistemol-
ogy, he does not argue for this claim. He does not, for instance, show that hermeneu-
tics or phenomenology in general "solves" the epistemological problem. 
Gadamer's main concern is not general epistemology. He is mainly concerned 
with hermeneutics as providing a general philological approach to textual interpreta-
tion. His starting point is, as he says, the human sciences. He asks the Kantian ques-
tion : how is understanding possible ? Rejecting the Diltheyan distinction between 
the human sciences and the natural sciences, he maintains that hermeneutics is uni-
versal in scope. According to Gadamer, a distinction cannot be drawn between a text 
and its influence, or effective history, since, as he puts it, "understanding belongs to 
the being of that which is understood."12 He claims that this thesis is valid across the 
board, hence universal, but only in specific historical conditions. "My thesis is that 
the element of effective-history is operative in all understanding of tradition [...]."13 
Gadamer, who is concerned to rehabilitate the tradition, has deep traditional roots 
in Aristotle, in the entire hermeneutical tradition, and in Heidegger. From Aristotle, 
he borrows the idea of phronesis that he applies to the human sciences and then, be-
yond them, to all interpretation. Aristotelian phronesis is a practical concept con-
cerning action. According to Aristotle, phronesis is a form of moral intelligence. The 
man who possesses practical wisdom knows how to deliberate. Practical wisdom is 
neither a science, nor an art, but a capacity to act well concerning good and evil for 
man.14 
Gadamer, who correctly reads Aristotelian phronesis as a practical concept,15 
changes the subject in appropriating the concept for his hermeneutical research.16 In 
his discussion of hermeneutics, he does not have in mind practical action in the Ar-
istotelian sense but rather the interpretation of texts. On this point, he follows Dil-
they, according to him the originator of modern hermeneutics. If Aristotle provides 
the idea of phronesis that he then applies to the human sciences, Heidegger offers the 
view of understanding on which Gadamer relies. 
Heidegger loosely follows Schleiermacher, who was the first to formulate a gen-
eral theory of the understanding that underlies interpretive rules. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger develops a theory of Dasein, or human being, as situated understanding 
(§31) that develops through interpretation (§ 32). According to Heidegger, all inter-
pretation presupposes a prior idea (Vorhabe) which it elaborates. 
Heidegger's problem is the metaphysical problem of the question of the meaning 
of Being. Gadamer appropriates Heidegger's theory of understanding for different 
ends. His most important move is to accentuate the idea of history in order to reha-
12. Hans-Georg GADAMER, Truth and Method, trans. Garret Barden and John dimming, New York, Cross-
roads, 1989, p. XIX. 
13.Ibid., p. XXI. 
14. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5, 1104a. 
15. See GADAMER, Truth and Method, p. 278-289. 
16. See ibid., p. 490. 
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bilitate the notion of tradition. Heidegger, who emphasizes tradition with respect to 
personal authenticity, rejects it with respect to textual interpretation. His view of the 
destruction of the history of ontology (§ 6) is intended to return behind the meta-
physical tradition in order to take up the question as it was originally raised in ancient 
Greece. 
There is an obvious tension in Heidegger's theory between the idea that textual 
understanding is hindered by tradition and the view of interpretation as based on a 
prior understanding. It is as if tradition, correctly, hence selectively appropriated, 
were central to being or becoming an authentic human being, who needs to authenti-
cally reenact the tradition, but a basic obstacle to the correct understanding of the 
metaphysical problem. 
Gadamer exploits this tension for his own hermeneutical purposes. He reinter-
prets the idea of a prior understanding of a text as prejudice (Vorurteil) and then as 
tradition. He points out that we cannot separate what is being interpreted from the 
history of its reception. In reading Gadamer, one should never overlook the fact that 
he was Heidegger's student and that he intends to remain faithful to his teacher to 
whom he has an almost reverential attitude. Yet, despite his intentions, he is one of 
Heidegger's severest and most penetrating critics. 
We see this, for instance, with respect to textual interpretation. Heidegger is per-
sistently interested in distinguishing between what he calls the vulgar, or inauthentic, 
and the authentic interpretation of texts. His view that we can return behind the tradi-
tion to understand ideas as they were originally expressed resembles the Protestant 
view of textual interpretation, summarized in the slogan sola scriptura. Flacius, for 
instance, denies the authority of tradition, hence the authority of the Roman Church 
with respect to the authorized interpretation of the texts. We recall, for instance, the 
counter-attack launched after the Council of Trent against Flacius by Cardinal Bel-
larmine in order to show that we cannot correctly interpret texts out of the historical 
context of their reception. 
In denying that what is to be interpreted can be separated from the history of its 
interpretation, in characterizing interpretation as based on the fusion of horizons (Ho-
rizontverschmelzung), Gadamer turns Heidegger's view of situated understanding 
against him. If we can only interpret from where we are, then we can never return 
behind the tradition to take up again the questions posed in the early Greek discus-
sion as they were originally raised. For the distinction between a vulgar form of tex-
tual interpretation, influenced by the tradition, and one that is authentic, because free 
of traditional influences, totally collapses. If this is the case, then one can no more 
provide an authentic reading of an author, say, Nietzsche, than one can understand 
the original way that the early Greeks raised the metaphysical question. In this way, 
Gadamer simply undermines the entire project of fundamental ontology. 
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IV. GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
According to Hegel, all claims to know belong to the historical moment in which 
they are formulated. Gadamer, who is closer to Hegel on this point than to Heideg-
ger, is only dimly aware of the epistemological consequences of this idea. Although 
he properly draws the implications of his view for textual interpretation, he does not 
do so for epistemology in general. He is hampered in this regard in that, although he 
regards hermeneutics as universal — indeed that is the official thesis of the book — 
he does not have a firm enough grasp of epistemology even to begin to go beyond 
textual interpretation to consider the problem of knowledge in general. 
Heidegger continually insists on authentic interpretation of the texts, meaning his 
own reading as opposed to any other. Gadamer, who is mainly interested in textual 
interpretation, is concerned to show that there cannot be a single correct reading of 
the texts. If we always and necessarily interpret from our present position within the 
historical flux, which is constantly subject to change, then we can never exclude al-
ternative readings, except obviously those that are not grounded in the texts. Differ-
ent readings are always possible, and a choice among them cannot be made solely by 
appealing to the texts themselves. It can only be made through importing further cri-
teria, such as explanatory richness, as an interpretive framework for construing texts. 
One consequence is that textual interpretation is an open-ended process, since 
each generation can legitimately claim to construe the classical texts differently. A 
further consequence is that the texts, like the interpretations, are not stable, but con-
stantly change. Since what we interpret is composed of the texts plus the history of 
their interpretation, the object of interpretation is constantly changing, never finally 
fixed. For Gadamer, the interpretive process resembles the process of experience that 
Hegel describes in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. In principle, for 
Hegel our view of the object and the object of the view can coincide, bringing the 
process to an end, whereas for Gadamer the process is literally endless. 
This view is controversial precisely because it suggests that the interpretive proc-
ess is endless. Critics such as Betti17 and Hirsch have charged that in rehabilitating 
the interpretive tradition, Gadamer transforms interpretation into simple relativism. 
Against Gadamer, Betti urges that the text is autonomous, so that the interpreter can 
know what the author intended to say in the text. The idea is that meaning can be de-
termined from the text itself. According to Betti, who employs Kantian terminology, 
Gadamer limits the discussion of hermeneutics to the quaestio facti and disregards 
the quaestio iuris. In response, Gadamer argues ad hominem that Betti is hostile to 
phenomenology.18 Yet this response misses the point, to which Gadamer should have 
responded that the justification is that the text cannot be isolated from its reception. 
Hirsch, who is committed to objective textual interpretation on an essentialist 
model, maintains that Gadamer grounds his theory in Heidegger's so-called radical 
17. See, e.g., Emilio BETTI, Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften, Tubingen, 
J.C.B. Mohr(Paul Siebeck), 1972. 
18. See GADAMER, Truth and Method, p. 466. 
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historicism. He sees Gadamer as maintaining a radical skepticism with regard to his-
torical knowledge. Although Heidegger stresses the historical dimension, it is, how-
ever, questionable to regard his commitment to authentic interpretation as radically 
historicist. It rather seems anti-historicist, since Heidegger is committed to something 
like absolute interpretive objectivity through authentic textual interpretation despite 
the historical flux. Heidegger is, then, close to the essentialist model that Hirsch de-
fends. Yet, if Gadamer is right, this model cannot be maintained, since we can never 
know a text other than as it appears within the interpretive tradition. 
The consequence for textual interpretation is clear and important. So far so good. 
But textual interpretation is a mere subset of the wider question of knowledge, or 
epistemology in general. It is a mistake to equate one with the other, as certain 
French writers, notably Ricoeur and Derrida sometimes seem to do. The textual ap-
proach is interesting, but also intrinsically limited. It is no more plausible to maintain 
that everything in the world can be reduced to a text than it is, following the Vienna 
Circle approach to physicalism, to argue that all the sciences can be re-expressed 
within the language of physics. Language can always be reduced to a text, but much 
of the human world is not linguistic in form and cannot be expressed as a text without 
doing violence to it. A description, for instance, of an athletic contest is not the con-
test itself but merely a representation of it. To deny this point is to deny that there is a 
distinction between the object and its representation. 
V. HERMENEUTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
Gadamer is correct to maintain the universality of hermeneutics, although he 
does not provide a convincing argument for this claim. He at best only demonstrates 
the need to take into account the historical dimension in the interpretation of anything 
that can be considered as a text. A better argument than anything that Gadamer pro-
vides can be constructed by examining the history of epistemology. 
The main modern approach to epistemology can be loosely characterized as epis-
temic foundationalism. By epistemic foundationalism I shall understand a peculiarly 
influential analysis of the relation of the representation to the object pioneered in the 
modern philosophical tradition by Descartes and reformulated by a large number of 
later thinkers. 
Epistemic foundationalism arises much earlier. It is already present in Aristotle, 
who, in the Posterior Analytics, argues for a theory based on one or more principles, 
which neither can be demonstrated nor require demonstration, and from which the 
remainder of the theory can be rigorously deduced. Descartes restates the Aristotelian 
approach in the form of a theory resting on a single initial principle that can be rigor-
ously demonstrated and from which the remainder of the theory can be rigorously 
deduced. Modern foundationalism, which can take many forms, typically includes an 
initial principle or principles known to be true, from which the remainder of the the-
ory can be rigorously deduced, hence an emphasis on system, a claim for apodictic-
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ity, or knowledge beyond the possibility of doubt, a causal theory of perception, and 
a justification of the inference from the representation to the object. 
Stated in this general way, modern epistemic foundationalism is obviously illus-
trated by numerous theories, including those of Descartes, who introduced its most 
influential modern form, and Kant. The latter, of course, rarely has anything positive 
to say about his French predecessor, whom he frequently criticizes, often unjustly, as 
when he accuses Descartes of denying the reality of the external world. 
Kant's critical attitude toward Descartes should not be allowed to hide the deep 
similarities in their epistemological views, including the emphasis on presupposi-
tionless system that is only extended in Kant, and the concept of the subject as the 
highest principle from which everything else is deduced. It is hardly an accident that 
the original synthetic unity of apperception, or "I think [lich denke'T that Kant fa-
mously claims is able "to accompany all my representations [Vorstellungen]"19 is the 
exact translation of the Cartesian cogito, from cogitare. For Kant — as he notes in an 
important letter from the critical period to Marcus Herz — as for Descartes, the 
problem of knowledge comes down to justifying the inference from the representa-
tion to the object.20 
It is easy to see that the epistemological problem, which runs throughout the en-
tire later discussion, cannot be solved when formulated in this way. If this inference 
holds, then it must be possible to show that the representation corresponds to the ob-
ject, or, as Descartes says, that his image of the sun corresponds to the sun. On a 
causal theory of perception, it can be shown that, if there are ideas in the mind, there 
must be an external world. Yet there is no way to demonstrate that the image of the 
sun corresponds to the sun, since there is no way to get outside the subject to com-
pare its representation to the object. In more technical language, we cannot show that 
the correspondence theory of truth holds. 
In the space we have available, it is not possible to develop this argument in de-
tail. Suffice it to say that we cannot remain indifferent to the failure of epistemic 
foundationalism. If we choose not to return to Greek intuitionism featuring a different 
grasp of independent reality, and we desire to avoid skepticism, then the only alter-
native is to appeal to a form of hermeneutics, or a description of the process of 
knowledge not elaborated prior to and apart from but rather within experience. 
The failure of epistemic foundationalism provides a strong argument, perhaps as 
strong as can be supplied, not, as Rorty would have it, for the alternative to episte-
mology, since there is no reason to endorse skepticism, but rather for a revised form 
of epistemology as hermeneutics. For after the conceptual demise of foundationalism, 
hermeneutics has become the epistemology of our time, the best hope if we are not 
merely to abandon theory of knowledge. Epistemology is not the polar opposite of 
19. See Immanuel KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith, New York, St. Martin's, B 131, p. 152. 
20. See letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772, in Immanuel KANT, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-
1799, trans. Arnulf Zweig, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 71. 
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hermeneutics, or interpretation, since it is merely one, particularly strong, or rigid, 
interpretation of knowledge. 
VI. HISTORICISM AND COGNITIVE OBJECTIVITY 
Gadamer, of course, does not make anything like this argument, in part because 
(even if his instincts are good) he is neither concerned with nor aware of the wider 
epistemological debate that surpasses his concern with textual interpretation. I be-
lieve that the hermeneutical approach must be carried beyond the point at which 
Gadamer leaves it to show its promise as an approach to knowledge in general. With 
that in mind, I want now to consider briefly two issues that Gadamer addresses but 
that require further discussion, including historicism and cognitive objectivity, and 
the relation of language and thought. In both cases, my aim will be to give these is-
sues an epistemological formulation that goes beyond what Gadamer has in mind. 
By historicism I shall understand the doctrine that human knowledge is irreduci-
bly historical and that there can be no ahistorical perspective. Hegel, whom many 
writers accuse of favoring an absolute view of knowledge, is in fact a historicist. He 
restricts claims for knowledge to the perspective of the historical moment that one 
contingently happens to inhabit. Gadamer is a historicist in the Hegelian mold, since 
he also denies that we can have claims that surpass the view from where we are. The 
difficulty, if we cannot claim to intuit an independent real, nor to perceive essences, 
nor to reason from a principle or principles known to be true to the way world must 
be experienced, is to reconcile claims for historical contingency and cognitive objec-
tivity. 
Gadamer has no way to handle this difficulty since he has no general conception 
of epistemology, hence of such epistemological questions as the justification of 
claims to know. Betti is correct to object that Gadamer limits the hermeneutical ques-
tion to a quaestio facti while avoiding the quaestio iuris. Gadamer, who points to 
phenomenology as description, provides two disparate, but unsatisfactory responses 
to this difficulty. On the one hand, he answers the question of how to justify claims to 
know if as if description counted as a cognitive justification. Yet description no more 
counts in this regard than does causality within a naturalistic framework. Epistemo-
logical foundationalism, which proposes a justification, fails since it cannot demon-
strate the inference from the representation to the object. 
On the other hand, Gadamer points to the authority of tradition. Yet obviously 
tradition is not itself a guarantee of anything. To accept tradition as such would 
oblige us, say, to accept such traditional practices as anti-Semitism as a valid social 
criterion merely because it is traditional. Obviously, this won't do. We cannot accept 
merely any tradition, but only some traditions or perhaps only parts of some tradi-
tions. The problem then becomes which tradition or part thereof is acceptable, which 
only raises the question of cognitive justification in another form. 
From a hermeneutical perspective, the answer to this difficulty lies in a reinter-
pretation of cognitive objectivity that no longer depends on a one to one relation be-
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tween the perception and reality or on an inference from a fixed framework of in-
quiry to the way the world is. The alternative is a view of the social justification of 
claims to know, where what counts as an explanation is what the best informed peo-
ple at a given point in time are able to agree on. Gadamer is correct that the only jus-
tification we can give is social, but he is wrong to think that tradition as such justifies 
anything at all. 
Unlike Aristotle, I do not claim that our theory requires no justification. Unlike 
Kant, I do not claim that we can deduce a fixed framework that necessarily holds for 
all experience. I claim no more that to say that we know merely means that whatever 
it is that we claim to know agrees with the standards we currently happen to hold. I 
believe that there have never been stronger epistemic criteria and that we do not in 
fact require stronger criteria for knowledge. 
VII. LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 
There is a further question about relation of language and thought. Gadamer, who 
is interested in language, maintains that it is where the world and the subject meet. 
According to Gadamer, when we understand, we understand in language. His view of 
language includes three claims : 1) to utilize a word, any word, already prejudices the 
discussion ;21 2) language opens up an infinity of discussion since it is not, say, a pre-
schematism ;22 and 3) hermeneutic discussion guarantees truth, since "what the tool 
of method does not achieve must — and effectively can — be achieved by a disci-
pline of questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees truth."23 
Unlike Davidson, who suggests that language must refer to a common world 
since we understand each other,24 as speakers of Tagalog understand others speakers 
of Tagalog, Gadamer is making a rather different claim that what we know we know 
in language. If this is correct, then we can construe 1) and 2) as follows : 1) suggests 
that words are like explanatory frameworks ; whereas 2) suggests that such frame-
works have no limits. To maintain both theses simultaneously, we have to hold that 
words form an explanatory matrix within which there is no limit to further discussion. 
The obvious question is why or how this framework guarantees truth, as Gadamer 
claims. 
If by truth we mean anything like getting it right, then hermeneutics obviously 
abandons this possibility, although perhaps it offers what we can mean by truth after 
the failure of foundationalism. For if we cannot know the way the world is by linking 
up our language with the world, say through a semantic theory of reference, we can 
at least discuss it in language. Gadamer's difficulty is that he apparently does not no-
tice the difference between words, which shape our thoughts, and explanatory matri-
21. See GADAMER, Truth and Method, p. 496. 
22. See ibid., p. 498. 
23. Ibid., p. 447. 
24. See, e.g., "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," in Donald DAVIDSON, Inquiries into Truth and Interpre-
tation, New York, Oxford, 1984, p. 199-214. 
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ces, between natural languages, say Chinese, and a conceptual framework, such as 
relativity theory. 
I believe that Gadamer's view of language is too general to describe our actual 
practices that consist in formulating general, or holistic, views that we then test, and 
if necessary revise, in piecemeal fashion, against experience. The hermeneutic proc-
ess only yields truth if what we mean by this term is agreement around a general 
view, subject to change, that, as Sellars says, provides us with "the logical space of 
reasons of justifying and being able to justify what one says."25 Language is not itself 
a conceptual scheme about the nature of reality formulated through a hermeneutical 
process, although such schemes are indeed formulated in this way in language. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
I come now to my conclusion. Against Gadamer, I have argued that hermeneu-
tics, as he understands it, does not resolve the epistemological problem but that it of-
fers promising possibilities. Against Rorty, I have argued that in embracing herme-
neutics we need not turn away from epistemology since, after the decline of founda-
tionalism, hermeneutics is our most promising approach to epistemology. Gadamer 
maintains, but does not demonstrate, the universality of hermeneutics, which he de-
scribes but does not justify. I have attempted to supply some of the arguments lacking 
in Gadamer through a brief remark on the history of modern epistemology. I have 
also sought to suggest revisions in the understanding of hermeneutics with respect to 
historicism and language. 
Hermeneutics is not an alternative to epistemology. It is rather an alternative to a 
form of epistemology, which depends on normative interpretation of knowledge. This 
interpretation has led to an epistemological approach which has long dominated the 
discussion from Descartes to recent analytic philosophy, which has been persistently 
committed to making out an impossible Cartesian dream. The interest of herrneneu-
tics is that when we awake, as awake we must, from this dream, we see that it is not 
an alternative to, but rather a viable approach to epistemology. 
25. See Wilfrid SELLARS, Science, Perception and Reality, London, Routledge, 1963, p. 169. 
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